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FEDERAL TAXATION: INSTRUCTION TO PAY PREMIUMS
FOR INSURANCE ON LIFE OF DONEE FROM TRUST
ASSETS HELD TO QUALIFY UNDER SECTION 2503 (c)
THE Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Duncan v. United States1
has held that the settlor of an inter vivos trust is allowed the 3000-
dollar annual exclusion under section 2503 of the gift tax provisions2
although the trust instrument provides that the trustee is to use all
available assets of the trust to pay the premiums on insurance policies
on the lives of the minor donees; The taxpayers, husband and wife,
had established separate inter vivos trusts for each of seven minor
grandchildren and had transferred to each trust stock, cash, and a
substantial insurance policy on the life of the grandchild. Each trust
instrument provided broad discretionary powers for the professional
trustee, including authority to dispose of trust property.8 However,
Paragraph 12 of the instrument directed the trustee to "apply any
and all available funds and assets" of the trust to payment of premi-
ums on- the life insurance transferred to the trust.4 The Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue disallowed the taxpayers' claimed ex-
clusions on the theory that Paragraph 12 constituted a "substantial
restriction" 5 on the trustee's discretion and thus barred the gifts
from the exclusion. In the taxpayers' subsequent refund suit, the
district court decided that Paragraph 12 prevented the trusts from
qualifying for the annual exclusion under section 2503 (c),6 particu-
larly since the face value of each policy could be realized only after
the beneficiary had died. The Fifth Circuit held, however, that the
trusts did qualify because the specific language of the direction to
pay premiums did not restrict the trustee's discretion and further
because the gift of insurance on each donee's life was not inherently
a gift of a future interest.
The Internal Revenue Code allows a 3000-dollar annual exclusion
1 368 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1966).
'INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2503 (b).
3868 F.2d at 100, 101 nn.6, 9.
'Id. at 101.
Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-4 (b) (1) (1958).
'Duncan v. United States,, 65-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 97160 (MD. Fla. June 9, 1965),
ra.'d, 368 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1966).
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from taxable gifts except on gifts of future interests. 7 In 1945, the
Supreme Court held that the distinction between present and future
interests as it then existed s prevented the exclusion for a gift in trust
to minors where there was no requirement that the property be
presently expended for the minor's benefit.9 The inhibiting effect
of that decision 10 was never fully overcome until the passage of
section 2503 (c) in the 1954 Code.11 This section was added expressly
to grant the exclusion to trust gifts for minors,12 but then only if the
"property and the income therefrom way be expended" by the
trustee for the donee's benefit before he attains the age of twenty-one
years and the trust is to be turned over to the donee at his twenty-
first birthday or to his estate if he should die before reaching twenty-
one.13 The Internal Revenue Service has been generally unsuccess-
ful in its attempts to impose a strict construction upon the pro-
visions calling for termination of the trust when the donee reaches
majority14 and for transfer of the trust property to the donee's estate
if he dies before reaching twenty-one.' 5
The regulations provide that a gift to a minor "may be ex-
pended" and hence qualify for the exclusion even though
there is left to the discretion of a trustee the determination of the
amounts, if any, of the income or property to be expended for the
benefit of the minor and the purpose for which the expenditure
is to be made, provided there are no substantial restrictions under
the terms of the trust instrument on the exercise of such discre-
tion.' 6
INT. REV. CODE Or 1954, § 2503 (b); Treas.. Reg. § 25.2503-3 (1958). See generally
LOWNDES & KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAxEs § 33 (2d ed. 1962).8 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 1003 (b), 53 Stat. 146 (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 2503 (b)).
9 Fondren v. Commissioner, 324 U.S. 18, 24-25 (1945), 44 MinC. L. REV. 321; accord,
Commissioner v. Disston, 325 U.S. 442 (1945); see Helvering v. Hutchings, 312 U.S.
393 (1941) (trust beneficiary rather than the trustee is donee of gift).
10 H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 93 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. 127 (1954); see Lentz, Drafting a Section 2503(c) Trust for a Minor, 38 DIrA
11, 12-13 (1961).
21 See Duffey v. United States, 182 F. Supp. 765 (D. Minn. 1960) (future interest
under 1939 Code provisions would have qualified under § 2503 (c)).
12 H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 93 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. 127 (1954).
23 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2503 (c).
21 Se Arlean I. Herr, 35 T.C. 732 (1961), aff'd, 303 F.2d 780 (3d Cir. 1962), nonacq.,
196g-2 Cum. BULL. 6, 43 B.U.L. REV. 356; accord, Rollman v. United States, 342 F.2d
62 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
1I See Jacob Konner, 35 T.C. 727 (1961>, nonacq., 1963-2 CuM. BULL. 6; accord, Carl
E. Weller, 38 T.C. 790, 807-10 (1962), nonacq., 1963-2 Cum. BULL. 6.
:1 Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-4 (b) (1) (1958). (Emphasis added.)
[Vol. 1967: 439
Vol. 1967: 439] FEDERAL TAXATION 441
Until Ross v. United States17 in 1965, however, no reasoned opinion
dealt directly with a trustee's discretion to expend the trust prop-
erty.'5 The Fifth Circuit in Ross was confronted with a gift in
trust under the terms of which the trustee was given the powers of
a guardian but no explicit authority to invade corpus. Thus, the
trustee was, under state law, able to invade corpus only through court
action or in case of emergency. 19  Without considering whether the
restrictions were "substantial," the court held that, despite the state
law restrictions, the entire gift qualified for the exclusion.20
The trust in Duncan posed the further question whether a simi-
larly unrestricted gift will be disqualified because insurance on the
life of the donee, a common form of gifts of insurance,21 is inherently
a future interest since the donee can never realize the face value of
the policy. While the gift tax provisions of the 1954 Code are silent
on insurance,22 the regulations2 permit it to qualify for the annual
exclusion so long as the donor surrenders the incidents of owner-
ship,24 but they make no distinction between insurance on the life
of the donor and that on the life of the donee.25 The only case
which appears to have specifically discussed insurance on the life of
the donee, Arthur A. Frank,26 decided under the Revenue Act of
1932,27 seems to indicate that a policy on the donee's life is fully
capable of being a present interest.28 Some state legislatures ap-
parently have acted on that assumption by adding gifts of life in-
surance to their enactment of the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act,29
17 348 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1965), 1966 DuKE L.J. 578.
28 But cf. De Concini v. Wood, 60-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 76438 (D. Ariz. Jan. 28, 1960)
(need for resort to equity court is not prohibitive restriction).
10 Ross v. United States, 226 F. Supp. 333, 336 (S.D. Tex. 1963), rexed, 348 F.2d 577
(5th Cir. 1965).
20 348 F.2d at 581. See Commissioner v. Thebaut, 361 F.2d 428 (5th Cir. 1966).
2 1 McKay, Life Insurance in Estate Planning, 43 B.UJL. RFv. 270, 281 (1963).
2 2 But cf. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2042 (taxation of life insurance under the
estate tax).
-s Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3 (a) (1958). See Harbeck Halsted, 28 T.C. 1069 (1957)
(trust gift of insurance on donor's life qualifies for exclusion).
2 Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1 (g) (8) (1958). See Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-6 (1958) (criteria
for valuation of life insurance); LOWNDES & KRAMER, Op. cit. supra note 7, § 33.8; Note,
1967 DuKE L.J. 193 (incidents of ownership for estate tax purposes).
2 5 B ut see 868 F2d at 102 n.12.
28 13 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1291 (1944).
27 Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 504 (b), 47 Stat. 247 (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 2503 (b)).
28 13 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. at 1293-94.
. See Aland, Tax and Substantive Aspects of Gifts to Minors, 18 ALA. L. REv. 82,
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which, as originally drafted to cover gifts of cash and securities, has
been ruled to meet the standards of section 2503 (c).30
The Government argued in Duncan that the direction in Para-
graph 12 required a retention of the corpus and an accumulation
of income by the trustee to pay the premiums.31 The court of ap-
peals, however, in determining whether there was any restriction
seized on the phrase "apply any and all available funds and assets" 32
and accordingly decided that Paragraph 12 referred only to funds
that were at the disposal. of the trustee 3 Hence, when it construed
each trust as a whole, noting that the other terms permitted full
expenditure, the court determined that availability of funds for
the premium payments was "entirely dependent upon the trustee's
discretion."3 4 Regardless of the reasonableness of that construction,
the court held that the trusts would nevertheless qualify for the
exclusion if the restriction were insubstantial.3 5 The district court
had reasoned that the gifts themselyes were future interests since the
payments to be made were on policies for the minors' own lives and
therefore were "not for the present benefit and enjoyment of the
minors involved, but rather for their estates."3 6 However, the court
of appeals held that the payment of premiums was "not an expendi-
ture for the future interest of the minor or his estate," 37 because the
cash surrender value and the possibility of immediate transfer, can-
cellation, or other means of disposal made each policy a viable asset
the present value of which was enhanced by the premium payments.
The order to pay premiums merely substituted one form of trust
property, cash, for another, a paid-up policy, which still could be
expended for the minor's present benefit. Thus, even if the direc-
tion to pay premiums was a restriction, it was not a substantial one.8
The Fifth Circuit read the trust instrument in a manner which
100 n.113 (1965); CAL. Crv. CODE § 1155 (p) (explicitly includes policies on life of
donee).30 Rev. Rul. 59-357, 1959-2 Cum. BuLL. 212. See Newman, The Uniform Gifts to
Minors Act in New York and Other Jurisdictio7is-Tax Consequences, Possible Abuses,
and Recommendations, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 12, 35-43 (1963).
8165-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 97161.
832 368 F.2d at 102. (Emphasis supplied by the court.)
8"Ibid.
21 Ibid.
"8 Ibid.
- 86 65 U.S. Tax Cas. at 97,163.
S7 368 F.2d at 102.
"8 Id. at 103.
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seems consistent with the settlor's intentions. The wording of the
trust instrument39 indicates that it was deliberately designed to fit
the tests of section 2503 (c). While Paragraph 12 may have pur-
ported to limit the other terms of the trust and to restrict the trustee,
it is more likely, as the court indicated, that it was intended to be
a guidance device for the trustee in his handling of the assets. How-
ever, this aspect of the decision should not alone mean that the gift
qualified for the exclusion. The intent of Congress seemingly was
to provide that gifts in trust to minors which had been held to be
future interests solely because of the trust nature of the gift should
thenceforth be granted the 3000-dollar exclusion from the gift tax.
It would be a stultification of that intent to allow any trust gift to a
minor, particularly one where the corpus of the trust was otherwise
a future interest, to qualify for the exclusion merely by use of the
term "available." Thus, if a gift of insurance on the life of the
donee would be inherently a future interest, even if given outright
instead of by trust,40 section 2503 (c) should still not be applic-
able. Of more general importance, however, is the rejection of the
district court's application of the future-interest/present-interest
dichotomy to insurance on the life of the donee. The test of a life
insurance gift is whether the donee, or trustee when the gift is in
trust, has the ability to realize immediately the present value of the
policy. When, if ever, the donee may receive the face value of the
policy is irrelevant in the case of a gift on the donor's life. There
is no rational basis for deciding otherwise when the insurance is on
the life of the donee. The Fifth Circuit's clarification of the present-
interest/future-interest distinction and its determination that in-
surance on the donee's life is not to be considered a future interest
are significant aids in the drafting of trusts designed to meet the
test of the "may be expended" clause. At the same time, Duncan
generally reinforces the liberal interpretation of section 2503 (c)
which had been initiated in cases construing other elements of the
code provision.41
"O Id. at 100-01 nn.6-8.
"'See Rollman v. United States, 342 F.2d 62 (Ct. Cl. 1965); Carl E. Weller, 38 T.C.
790, 807-10 (1962), nonacq. 1963-2 Cum. BULL. 6; Arlean I. Herr, 55 T.C. 732 (1961),
nonacq. 1962-2 Cum. BULL. 6; Jacob Konner, 55 T.C. 727 (1961), nonacq. 1963-2 CUM.
BULL. 6.
' See notes 1415 supra and accompanying text.
